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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
CHRISTOPHER SULLIVAN, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH BOARD OF OIL, GAS & 
MINING; and KERR-McGEE OIL & 
GAS ONSHORE LP, 
Respondents/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE BOARD OF 
OIL, GAS & MINING 
Case No.: 20070410 
Petition For Review of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
of the Utah Board of Oil, Gas & Mining 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and 
Mining (the "Board"). This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(e)(iv) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
In this appeal, Petitioner/Appellant Christopher M. Sullivan ("Sullivan") raises the 
following issues, governed by the following standards of review. Some of these issues 
are raised for the first time on appeal and are therefore not properly before this Court. 
1. Did Sullivan waive his right to challenge the Board's decision not to set a 
hearing by failing to request a hearing below? 
1 
Sullivan may raise on appeal only matters raised before the Board below, and is 
deemed to have waived all other issues. Associated General Contractors v. Board of Oil, 
Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112, <(27 n.5 and <f34 n.7, 38 P.3d 291; Brown & Root Indus. 
Service v. Industrial Comm'n, 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997); Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 
973 P.2d 982, 985 (Utah App. 1998) 
2. Does Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9 impose a non-discretionary duty on the 
Board to conduct a formal adjudicatory hearing in response to Sullivan's Request for 
Agency Action? 
Although not preserved below given his withdrawal of his request for a hearing, 
Sullivan argues in this appeal that the subject statute conferred upon him a "right" to a 
hearing before the Board on the merits of his unpaid royalty claims. Brief of Petitioner at 
14. Section 40-6-9(6), however, explicitly grants the Board discretion to either (a) set a 
hearing on the merits, or (b) instead allow the petitioner to seek a remedy in district court 
(as the Board did here). Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9(6) (West 2004). The Board's 
interpretation of the governing statute is reviewed by this Court for correctness.1 WWC 
1
 Sullivan suggests that the Board's failure to set a hearing can be reviewed not only in 
light of the correctness of the Board's interpretation of the statute but also under Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(e) as a failure to follow prescribed procedure. Brief of 
Petitioner at 23, 30. Of course, the setting of a hearing is only the "prescribed" procedure 
if the statute indeed requires it. In any case, this Court should employ the same correction 
of error standard in deciding whether the Board failed to follow a procedure prescribed by 
statute as it does in reviewing the Board's interpretation of the statute. See SEMECO 
Industries, Inc. v. Auditing Division, 849 P.2d 1167, 1172 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., 
dissenting). 
2 
Holding Co., Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 2002 UT 23, <|8, 44 P.3d 714; Bennion v. 
Graham Resources, Inc., 849 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 1993). 
3. Did the Board abuse its discretion in opting not to set a hearing and instead 
deferring to the pending state court action? 
Despite withdrawing his request for a hearing below and waiving the issue, 
Sullivan contends the Board abused its discretion in not setting a hearing. Brief of 
Petitioner at 6 and 24. The Board's exercise of the discretion delegated to it by statute is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion, and will be disturbed only if it exceeds the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) (West 2004); WWC 
Holding Co., 2002 UT 23, ^8; Thorup Bros. Constr., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 860 
P.2d 324, 327 n.6 (Utah 1993); Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Division., 814 P.2d 581, 587 
(Utah 1991); King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Utah App. 1993). 
4. Does Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9 mandate that the Board issue an injunction 
requiring that any disputed monies be deposited into an escrow account, regardless of 
whether the Board retains the case and sets a hearing? This Court will review this legal 
question for correctness. WWC Holding Co., 2002 UT 23, <|[8; Bennion, 849 P.2d at 570. 
If not compelled to issue an escrow injunction by statute, did the Board nevertheless 
abuse its discretion in declining to do so? The Board's exercise of discretion granted by 
statute is to be reviewed for abuse of discretion and upheld if reasonable and rational. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) (West 2004); WWC Holding Co., 2002 UT 23,18; 
3 
Thorup Bros. Constr., 860 P.2d at 327 n.6; Morton lnt'U 814 P.2d at 587; King, 850 P.2d 
at 1286. 
5. Did the Board abuse its discretion in not continuing or staying its 
proceeding pending the outcome of the parallel district court action? 
Because Sullivan did not request any stay of proceedings below, he is deemed to 
have waived this issue. Associated General Contractors, 2001 UT 112, %L1 n.5 and (][34 
n.7; Brown & Root, 947 P.2d at 677; Whitear, 973 P.2d at 985. bven if this issue had 
been preserved, however, the statute does not provide for such a stay, and the Board's 
action in not granting one was therefore proper. The Board's construction of the statute 
on this point is reviewed for correctness. WWC Holding Co., 2002 UT 23, [^8, Bennion, 
849 P.2d at 570. 
6. Has Sullivan demonstrated that he was substantially prejudiced by the 
Board's actions as required by Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)? 
4 
This Court shall grant relief "only if, on the basis of the agency's record2, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced" for 
any of the reasons enumerated in the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-16(4) (West 2004); WWC Holding Co., 2001 UT 23, f7; Morton lnt'l, 814 
P.2d at 584. "In making this determination, the court will apply different standards of 
review depending on whether the issue is one of fact, law, or leyal discretion." WWC 
Holding Co., 2001 UT 23, f7. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
This appeals centers on the provisions of the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §40-6-1, et seq., and in particular Section 9 of the Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§40-6-9, which is attached hereto in its entirety as an addendum. This appeal is governed 
by the terms of Section 16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-16, et seq., also attached in its entirety. 
2
 Sullivan's repeated suggestion that the Board's record is not complete lacks merit. See 
Brief of Petitioner at 6, 20 and 30. Every filing made with the Board, every exhibit 
offered, every transcript of every hearing, and all other necessary documents are included 
in the record transmitted by the Board to this Court. Although Sullivan does not state his 
objections on this issue with any specificity, he appears to fault the Division (a separate 
entity from the Board and a party to the Board's proceedings, see Utah Code Ann. §40-6-
4 and 15 (West 2004); Utah Admin. Code R641-101-100 (2007)) for not submitting to the 
Board materials exchanged by the parties during the investigation and negotiation period. 
See Brief of Petitioner at 6 (complaining of the lack of a record concerning the Division's 
investigation) and 20 (same). If this is Sullivan's complaint he has no one to blame but 
himself. If Sullivan was dissatisfied with the completeness of the Division's report to the 
Board regarding the investigation, or desired that any documents exchanged by the parties 
in that informal process be included in the Board's record, it was incumbent upon 
Sullivan to file those documents as exhibits himself pursuant to the procedures clearly 
spelled out in Utah Admin. Code R641-105-500 and 600 (2007). 
5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Sullivan's Request for Agency Action. 
On July 31, 2006, Sullivan filed a Request for Agency Action ("Petition") 
asserting entitlement to unpaid oil and gas royalties allegedly owed him by 
Respondent/Appellee Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Onshore LP ("KMG") (R.2-32). Through 
his Petition, Sullivan invoked a statutorily-defined process whereby an aggrieved party 
may petition the Board for a hearing to determine why the allegedly owed proceeds have 
not been paid. See Utah Code Ann.§ 40-6-9(4) (West 2004). 
2. The Contract Interpretation and Real Property Title Questions 
at the Heart of the Dispute. 
In his Petition, Sullivan notes that the dispute involves claims by KMG that 
Sullivan's royalty interest has terminated and that resolution of the dispute hinges upon 
competing interpretations of contractual language concerning that interest (R.3-4, 8-30). 
In its Response to Request for Agency Action filed on September 11, 2006, KMG 
concurred with Sullivan that the dispute hinges upon a contract/title dispute (R.66-67, 
69). As discussed more fully below, KMG urged that the contract/title issues should be 
decided by a court rather than by the Board (R.68-69). 
3. Parallel Judicial Proceeding. 
Given the contract interpretation and real property title questions at issue, on 
September 14, 2006, KMG filed an action in the Eighth Judicial District Court against 
6 
Sullivan seeking a declaratory judgment to resolve the dispute (R.108). KMG also 
asserted claims for alleged overpayments made to Sullivan. Brief of Petitioner at 12. 
4. Board's Referral of Matter to Division for Investigation and Negotiation. 
Following the filing of Sullivan's Petition, the Board, as required by statute, see 
Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9(5) (West 2004), referred the matter to the Division of Oil, Gas 
& Mining (the "Division") for a 60-day period of investigation and negotiation3 (R.183 at 
5-8, R.98). After receiving information submitted by Sullivan and KMG, the Division 
conducted a negotiation session with the parties (R.99-109). During the negotiations, 
each party presented its case, the Division asked clarifying questions, and the parties 
broke up into separate rooms for discussion and possible resolution (R.185 at 6). The 
negotiations did not resolve the dispute (R.107). 
Because the dispute was not resolved through negotiation, pursuant to the express 
terms of the statute, the Board was confronted with a decision to either (a) set a hearing 
on the matter, or (b) instead allow the parties to seek a remedy in a court of competent 
jurisdiction (in this case, the already-pending state court action). Utah Code Ann. §40-6-
9(6) (West 2004). 
%
 Contrary to Sullivan's contentions, see Brief of Petitioner at 12-13, the Board did not 
seek the "permission and consent" of KMG or any other party prior to referring the matter 
to the Division for investigation and negotiation. While the Board gave the parties an 
opportunity to state any objections they might have had to such referral, and each party 
ultimately stipulated to the appropriateness of the referral, (R.183 at 3-8), the Board did 
not treat the referral as requiring any party's "consent." 
7 
5. The Division's Report. 
On February 13, 2007, the Division issued its Memorandum Regarding 
Investigation and Negotiations (the "Division's Report"). The Division's Report 
summarizes the dispute, the Division's investigation4, and the failure of the negotiations 
to resolve the matter (R.99-108). 
The Division's Report notes that the case concerns an underlying contract/title 
dispute centering on language found in a lease assignment (R.100, 104-107). The 
Division noted that the statute permits the Board to either set a hearing for purposes of 
determining whether a ''reasonable justification" exists for KMG's having withheld 
payment, or to instead simply allow the parties to seek redress in court (R.101). The 
Division argued that the applicable statute gave no indication that the legislature intended 
the Board (a lay legal body) to supplant the courts and hear contract and title disputes 
merely because such disputes pertained in some way to oil and gas proceeds (R.103). 
Because the parties are involved in a good-faith dispute concerning whether 
4
 Sullivan complains in his brief that the Division failed to conduct an "actual 
investigation." Brief of Petitioner at 22 and 24. No issue concerning any alleged 
deficiencies in the Division's informal investigation and negotiation process is before this 
Court on appeal, however. Although Sullivan voiced some dissatisfaction with the 
Division's actions in a written submission below in which he requested a continuance to 
gather more information (which was granted) (R.l 10-115), he requested no relief of the 
Board to remedy any alleged deficiencies in the Division's process. Instead, Sullivan 
unambiguously limited his prayer for relief to an injunction requiring a deposit of 
disputed funds into escrow pending resolution of the dispute in district court, and nothing 
more (R.l 86 at 21). Sullivan may not ask this Court to remedy any alleged deficiencies 
in the Division's investigation when he did not ask the Board to do so. Brown & Root, 
947 P.2d at 677; Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d at 985. 
8 
Sullivan has title to an interest entitling him to payment, the Division stated that its 
"investigation did not find any information that, if offered and proved in a hearing before 
the Board, would show that Kerr McGee suspended payments to Sullivan without a good 
faith judgment that the payments were not owed. Without such facts being alleged there 
is no basis for a hearing on any issue the Board is authorized to decide." (R.108). The 
Division therefore urged the Board to exercise its discretion under the statute to decline to 
set a hearing and to instead allow the parties to pursue their remedies in the pending 
district court action (R.108). 
6. The Hearing before the Board Concerning Whether the Board 
Would Retain the Case. 
On March 28, 2007, the Board held a hearing for the sole purpose of deciding 
whether to exercise its discretion under Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9(6) to (a) set a hearing on 
the matter, or (b) to instead allow the parties to seek a remedy in court. 
Consistent with its written submissions, KMG urged the Board not to set a hearing 
on the merits, arguing that the primary aim of such a hearing (to determine "why the 
proceeds have not been paid" and whether any "reasonable justification" exists for the 
nonpayment, see Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9(4) and (7)) was already satisfied in that the 
underlying contract/title dispute was the undisputed reason for the nonpayment (R.68-69, 
185 at 16-17). 
The Division similarly argued that no hearing was necessary because the answers 
to the primary questions the Board would take up at such a hearing (concerning 
9 
"reasonable justification" for nonpayment, etc.) were already known and not in dispute 
(R.185 at 8-9). The Division further noted that the matter involved an underlying contract 
and title dispute of a kind not usually seen by the Division and Board in royalty matters 
(R.l 85 at 6-7 and 9), and urged the Board to exercise its statutorily-granted discretion to 
allow the dispute to be litigated in court where such issues are more appropriately 
resolved (R.185 at 7-8). 
Significantly, Sullivan did not dispute the Division's or KMG's representations at 
the hearing that all parties agreed that a reasonable justification existed for KMG's 
nonpayment.5 In fact, Sullivan orally amended his prayer for relief and withdrew his 
request for a hearing, noting "that this is a matter best decided beiore a court" (R.185 at 
11). (See also R.185 at 21). Sullivan narrowed his prayer to one limited request for 
relief: that the Board issue an injunction compelling KMG to deposit the disputed funds 
into escrow pending resolution of the underlying dispute in court (R.185 at 11, 21 ).6 This 
It was represented by the Division at the hearing that in light of the contract/title dispute 
between the parties, there was "no dispute that Kerr-McGee is acting on its good faith 
belief that money isn't due," and that "the reason the proceeds are unpaid is because [the 
parties] disagree as to whether they are, in fact, owed to Sullivan" (R.185 at 7, 9). Similar 
representations were made by KMG (R.185 at 16-17). At no time during the hearing did 
Sullivan dispute these statements. In fact, following the Division's statements, Sullivan's 
counsel merely noted that Sullivan believed an escrow injunction should be issued 
pending judicial resolution of the underlying contract/title dispute, but "[a]s to the rest of 
it, we concur with the Division." (R.185 at 11). 
6
 When pressed concerning whether Sullivan was requesting a hearing and whether the 
Board could grant any relief to Sullivan without one, Sullivan's counsel stated Sullivan 
would be willing to participate in a hearing to the extent necessary for an escrow 
injunction "if the Board hearing can be narrowed to that single issue." (R.185 at 27-28). 
Sullivan was therefore consistent in stating that he was not requesting the full hearing 
10 
single item of relief was Sullivan's sole request of the Board and is the only issue 
Sullivan may argue on appeal. 
7. The Board's Decision to Allow the Parties to Pursue Their Remedies 
in the Pending District Court Action. 
After hearing from each party, the Board by unanimous vote decided not to set a 
hearing but to instead allow the parties to pursue their remedies in the pending, parallel 
district court action (R.185 at 29). 
In its April 25, 2007 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (the 
"Order"), the Board found, consistent with the parties' representations, that the subject 
dispute involved underlying contract/title questions that turn upon the interpretation of a 
1972 lease assignment (R. 150-151). The Board noted that given the parties' agreement 
that an underlying title dispute existed, the Division found after its investigation that there 
was no genuine controversy concerning whether payments were suspended based upon a 
"good faith judgment that the payments are not owed." (R.150). The Board also found 
that there was a pending, parallel district court action in which the same dispute is being 
litigated, (R.150-151), and that Sullivan conceded at the hearing that the dispute should 
be decided in state court rather than before the Board (R.151). 
The Board concluded that Section 40-6-9(6) expressly grants the Board discretion 
to either set a hearing or to instead allow the petitioner to seek redress in a court of 
contemplated in the statute, but was only requesting an injunction requiring an escrow 
and, if necessary, a hearing limited to that issue. As discussed more fully, below, 
however, the Board is without authority to grant such an injunction. Sullivan's limited 
request for such relief therefore presented the Board with no reason to set a hearing. 
11 
competent jurisdiction (R.151). The Board further concluded that while the statute 
authorizes the Board to grant certain remedies, such remedies may only be granted after a 
hearing, if a hearing is held (R.152). 
Given the underlying contract/title questions at issue and the parties' agreement 
that such questions are better decided by a court of law, given "the existence of a pending 
state court action in which those questions were already being litigated, and given 
Sullivan's withdrawal of his request for a hearing, the Board declined to set a hearing in 
the matter and instead invited the parties to pursue their remedies in the pending district 
court action.7 (R.152). As to Sullivan's sole remaining request for relief under his orally-
amended prayer (an injunction requiring KMG to escrow all disputed funds), the Board 
denied such request, (R.152), both because no relief could be granted unless a hearing 
7
 Sullivan is mistaken in arguing that the Board's disposition of his petition was a 
"dismissal" which is "analogous to a court's dismissal for failure to state a claim, 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)." Brief of Petitioner at 5 and 24. The Adkins case cited by 
Sullivan in support of this proposition arose out of the Board's dismissal of a petition 
specifically for its "failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Adkins v. 
Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 926 P.2d 880, 881 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added). See also 
id. at 883 (concerning the deficient allegations of the petition). The present case is 
distinguishable in that the Board did not "dismiss" Sullivan's petition for any facial 
deficiency, but instead entertained his petition and disposed of his request by electing to 
take one of the two alternative courses of action prescribed in the governing statute. The 
Board's disposition of Sullivan's petition was therefore in no way analogous to a 
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), and the Rule 12(b)(6) cases cited by Sullivan have no 
application here. Sullivan appears to have also cited the Bennion case in support of this 
proposition because it was cited in Adkins. Brief of Petitioner at 24. Adkins cited 
Bennion, however, only for the general proposition that the Board's legal conclusions are 
granted no deference, not because it pertained to Rule 12(b)(6). See Adkins, 926 P.2d at 
882. 
12 
was first held and because the subject statute confers upon the Board no power to issue 
the requested injunction in any event. 
8. Facts Relevant to Issues Presented for Review. 
Based upon the course of proceedings summarized above and the discretion vested 
in the Board under Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9(6), the facts relevant to the limited issues 
presented for review in this appeal are as follows: 
(1) Sullivan and KMG are in agreement that the unpaid royalty dispute between 
them hinges upon contract interpretation and real property title questions (R.3-4, 8-30, 
66-67,69,100,104-107). 
(2) The Board is a lay legal body, whose primary expertise pertains to geologic, 
engineering and other oil and gas related matters, rather than complex legal matters 
concerning contract interpretation or real property title issues. See Utah Code Ann. §40-
6-4(2) (West 2004) (setting forth composition of Board). 
(3) There is a declaratory judgment action concerning the dispute between 
these parties presently pending in the Eighth Judicial District Court for Uintah County, 
Utah (R. 108, 150-151). 
(4) The parties acknowledged at the March 28, 2007 hearing that the dispute 
would be better decided by the district court (R.l 85 at 7, 9-11, 13, 18 and 21). 
(5) Ultimately, Sullivan's sole request for relief from the Board was for an 
injunction requiring the deposit of disputed funds into escrow pending resolution of the 
dispute in district court (R.l85 at 21). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The statute at issue in this appeal permits an aggrieved royalty owner to file a 
petition with the Board seeking a hearing on the reasons for a payor's failure to pay 
royalties from oil and gas production. Contrary to Sullivan's contentions, however, the 
statute does not mandate that the Board set such a hearing. Instead, it expressly grants 
discretion to the Board to either set a hearing or to decline to set a hearing in favor of 
allowing the petitioner to seek redress in court. In the present case, the Board reasonably 
exercised its discretion in declining to set a hearing because (1) the answers to the 
primary questions the Board would explore if it held its own hearing were known and 
undisputed, (2) the underlying dispute involves legal issues of contract interpretation and 
real property ownership better left to a court of law, (3) there is a parallel judicial 
proceeding already pending, (4) the parties conceded the dispute would be better decided 
in the judicial forum, and (5) based on the preceding factors, petitioner Sullivan amended 
his prayer for relief and withdrew his request for a Board hearing. 
While Sullivan did request that the Board issue an injunction requiring KMG to 
escrow the disputed funds pending resolution of the underlying dispute in district court, 
the Board acted reasonably in denying such relief because the controlling statute only 
permits the granting of relief after a hearing //a hearing is held and does not authorize the 
Board to grant injunctive relief in any event. 
Sullivan's argument that the Board should have continued or stayed its proceeding 
during the pendency of the district court case lacks merit because Sullivan failed to 
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request, and the statute does not contemplate, such a continuance. 
Finally, Sullivan has failed to demonstrate the "substantial prejudice" required 
under UAPA to maintain this appeal because he was afforded all of the process and 
consideration he was entitled to under the statute and because he still has a forum (the 
pending district court case) in which to seek his remedy. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SULLIVAN WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL THE 
BOARD'S DECISION NOT TO SET A HEARING 
By withdrawing his request for a hearing below, (R.185 at 11 and 21, R.151), 
Sullivan waived his right to appeal the Board's decision not to set a hearing. This is true 
for three related reasons. 
First, the withdrawal of his request equates to a failure to raise the issue, and thus 
precludes any appeal. See Associated General Contractors v. Board of Oil, Gas & 
Mining, 2001 UT 112, <fl27 n.5 and <[34 n.7, 38 P.3d 291; Brown & Root Indus. Service v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997) (noting the "rule that courts should 
not reach issues on review that were not raised before an administrative agency is so basic 
and necessary to orderly procedure that we will enforce it despite the lack of a timely 
objection"); Whitear v. Labor Commn, 973 P.2d 982, 985 (Utah App. 1998). 
Second, because Sullivan's withdrawal of his request for a hearing, and his 
concession that the dispute would be "best decided before a court," (R.185 at 11 and 21), 
directly led to the Board's not setting a hearing and allowing him to instead proceed in 
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court, he invited the error of which he now complains (even assuming an error was 
made). See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) (noting doctrine of invited 
error prevents a party from appealing from an alleged error committed at trial "when that 
party led the trial court into committing the error"); State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, [^4, 128 
P.3d 1171 (noting the doctrine precludes appeal where a party "either by statement or act, 
affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the [action 
taken]"). 
Finally, in addition to operating as a waiver of his right to appeal on this issue, 
Sullivan's withdrawal of his request for a hearing before the Board and his consenting to 
proceeding in district court instead represents a failure by Sullivan to exhaust all of his 
administrative remedies. See Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-14(2) (West 2004) ("A party may 
seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available...."). 
II. THE GOVERNING STATUTE EXPRESSLY GRANTS THE BOARD 
DISCRETION TO DECLINE TO SET A HEARING AND TO 
INSTEAD ALLOW A PETITIONER TO GO TO COURT 
Even if Sullivan had preserved the issue for appeal, Sullivan's challenge of the 
Board's decision not to set a hearing lacks merit because he misconstrues the governing 
statute in contending that it confers upon him a "right" to such a hearing. Brief of 
Petitioner at 14. Pursuant to the express terms of Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9(6), the Board 
has discretion to either set a hearing, or to instead decline to set a hearing and allow the 
petitioner to seek a remedy in district court: 
(5) Upon receipt of the petition, the board shall set the matter for 
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investigation and negotiation by the division within 60 days. 
(6) (a) If the matter cannot be resolved by negotiation as of that date, the 
board may set a hearing within 30 days. 
(b) If the board does not set a hearing, any information gathered 
during the investigation and negotiation shall be given to the petitioner who 
may then seek a remedy in a court of competent jurisdiction. 
Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9(5) and (6) (2004) (emphasis added). 
The Board's interpretation of the governing statute is reviewed by this Court for 
correctness. WWC Holding Co., Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 2002 UT 23, ^8, 44 P.3d 
714; Bennion v. Graham Resources, Inc., 849 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 1993). In interpreting 
a statute, a reviewing court is "guided by the principle that a statute is generally construed 
according to its plain language." Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 
1995). Furthermore, the Court is to "presume that the legislature used each word 
advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." 
Id. 
In the present case, the statute's use of the word "may" when referring to the 
Board's setting of a hearing, and its express articulation of an alternative course of action 
where the Board "does not set a hearing," make abundantly clear that the Board has 
discretion to select either alternative. See Anabasis, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 30 P.3d 1236, 
1243 (Utah App. 2001) (noting that use of word "may " in statute entails a "legislative 
grant of discretion" to an agency, and permits the agency to either do or not do the action 
described); Bennion, 849 P.2d at 573 (use of word "may" in statute governing Board 
makes described action "purely discretionary"). The Board's action in declining to set a 
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hearing and instead allowing the parties to proceed in the already-pending district court 
action was one of two expressly contemplated actions the Board is given discretion to 
take under the statute. Sullivan's suggestion that the statute mandates that the Board set a 
hearing therefore lacks merit. 
III. THE BOARD REASONABLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DECLINING TO SET A HEARING AND IN DEFERRING TO THE 
PENDING DISTRICT COURT ACTION 
The Board's exercise of the discretion delegated to it under the statute is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion, see Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(h)(i), and will be disturbed 
only if it exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. WWC Holding Co., Inc. 
V. Public Service Commn, 2002 UT 23, <[8, 44 P.3d 714; Thorup Bros. Constr., Inc. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 860 P.2d 324, 327 n.6 (Utah 1993); Morton Int'l, Inc. v. 
Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 1991); King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 P.2d 
1281, 1286 (Utah App. 1993). 
As discussed in the Statement of Facts above, the Board reasonably exercised its 
discretion in declining to set a hearing because: (1) the answers to the primary questions 
the Board would explore if it held its own hearing were already known and were 
undisputed,8 (2) the underlying dispute involves complex contract interpretation and real 
x
 The statute specifies that the Board is to inquire at its hearing into (1) "why the proceeds 
have not been paid," Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9(4), (2) whether a "reasonable justification" 
exists for the nonpayment, Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9(7)(b), and (3) whether the disputed 
funds have been deposited into an escrow account, Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9(7). The 
remedies the Board is authorized to impose under the statute are dictated by the answers 
to these questions. In the present case, the underlying contract/title dispute is the 
acknowledged reason for the nonpayment, it was admitted at the hearing that such dispute 
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property title issues9 better resolved by a court of law10 (R.3-4, 8-30, 66-67, 69, 100, 104-
107, 150-151), (3) there was a parallel judicial proceeding concerning the dispute already 
formed a "reasonable justification" for nonpayment, see footnote 5 above, and it was 
conceded that no escrow account had been established. The fact that the answers to these 
questions were known and not in dispute diminished the need for any Board hearing. 
9
 Sullivan himself characterizes the title dispute as a complex one involving a host of 
contract construction issues including (1) the effect of a comma rather than a period 
separating operative and potentially modifying phrases, (R.17, 20), (2) the existence of 
patent or latent ambiguities in the contract language and the question of whom they 
should be construed against, (R.10, 20-22, 28-30), (3) the relevance of the parties' past 
course of conduct to the dispute, (R.l 8, 27-28), (4) whether, despite the absence of an 
integration clause, the subject contract is an integrated agreement for other reasons, 
(R.24-25), (5) the effect of the integration issue, together with the existence or 
nonexistence of ambiguities in the contract, on the admissibility of parol evidence, (R.24-
25, 27), and (6) issues concerning the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
(R.26). Given this range of arguments, the parties' contract/title dispute should be 
resolved by a legally-trained judge in a court of law. The Act simply does not 
contemplate that the Board (a lay legal body) would assume the position of a court and 
engage in the kind of heavy legal lifting necessary to resolve these issues. At the very 
least, it was a reasonable and rational exercise of the discretion explicitly granted it under 
the statute for the Board to decline to take up these complex legal issues and to instead 
defer to the already-pending district court action where such issues are better decided. 
10
 While the statute allows the Board to review private contracts at least to the extent 
necessary to decide the "reasonable justification" question, it does not appear to authorize 
the Board to act as a court of general jurisdiction to resolve any contract or real property 
question which might be implicated in an unpaid proceeds dispute. See Williams v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n, 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 1988) (noting that where a "specific power 
is conferred by statute upon a tribunal, board, or commission with limited powers, the 
powers are limited to such as are specifically mentioned," and "any reasonably doubt of 
the existence of any power must be resolved against the exercise thereof). Regardless of 
the precise extent of the Board's jurisdiction to reach such questions, however, for 
purposes of the present case it is important simply to note that the Board enjoys wide 
discretion pursuant to Section 40-6-9(6) to decline to set a hearing if it feels that the 
issues in dispute would be better resolved in court. The disputed contract and title issues 
in the present case are not ones which the Board's expertise would aid in resolving, and 
the parties themselves all conceded such issues would be better decided in district court 
(R. 185 at 6-7, 11 and 21). 
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pending, (R.108, 150-151), (4) the parties conceded the dispute would be better decided 
in the judicial forum, (R.l 85 at 7, 9-11, 13, 18 and 21, R.l 51), and (5) Sullivan amended 
his prayer for relief and withdrew his request for a Board hearing, (R.185 at 11 and 21, 
R.151). While each of these facts11 on its own is a sufficient reason for the Board's 
discretionary action, when taken together they demonstrate that the Board's decision was 
not only reasonable and rational, but was clearly the more appropriate alternative. 
11
 The Board's decision rests upon only these few core facts, which as discussed in the 
Statement of Facts above, are undisputed and supported by the record. Although Sullivan 
in his brief cites the "substantial evidence" standard of review for challenges to factual 
findings, Brief of Petitioner at 19, 25-26, he has challenged none of the core factual 
finding upon which the Board's decision rests. Instead, he suggests generally that the 
Board's decision "is based on a determination of facts. . . not supported by substantial 
evidence." Brief of Petitioner at 17. He fails to identify, however, either any particular 
findings made by the Board which aren't supported by substantial evidence, or any 
allegedly necessary findings that weren't made. Furthermore, although he acknowledges 
his marshaling burden in reciting the standards of review, he engages in no such 
marshaling of the evidence as part of his argument. The core facts concerning the 
existence of an underlying contract/title dispute, the existence of a parallel court case, and 
his own concession that the matter would be "better decided before a court" are all 
undisputed facts based upon his own attorney's representations at the March 28, 2007 
hearing as discussed more fully above (R.8-30, 66-67, 69, 100, 104-108; R. 108 at 6-11, 
13 and 21). Sullivan fails to even acknowledge those representations and statements. 
Sullivan seems merely to suggest broadly, without elaboration, that more evidence should 
have been taken and more findings made. Brief of Petitioner at 5, 20 and 30. He appears 
in these statements to simply complain that the Board didn't take evidence and make 
findings on issues it didn't reach because it didn't set a hearing. See Brief of Petitioner at 
30 (complaining that the Board didn't hear testimony at a hearing and didn't delve into 
the underlying title documents relevant to the contract dispute). The Board decision 
under appeal, however, is the threshold decision by the Board not to set a hearing, and the 
few findings the Board relied upon in taking that limited action are undisputed and 
supported amply by the record. 
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IV. THE BOARD REASONABLY AND PROPERLY DECLINED TO 
ORDER THE DEPOSIT OF DISPUTED FUNDS INTO ESCROW 
As noted above, Sullivan amended his prayer for relief at the March 28, 2007 
hearing, conceded the dispute over unpaid proceeds should be decided in the parallel 
court action, and limited his request of the Board solely to an injunction requiring KMG 
to escrow disputed funds (R.185 at 11 and 21). The denial of Sullivan's requested 
injunction is therefore the only Board action Sullivan may contest on appeal. 
Sullivan suggests that the statute imposes on the Board a non-discretionary duty to 
order an escrow of disputed funds. Brief of Petitioner at 8, 14 and 16-17. The statute, 
however, provides that the Board "may," following a hearing, impose certain remedies 
for the failure of a payor to establish an escrow account. Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9(7)(a) 
(West 2004). The granting of any relief is therefore discretionary and not mandatory. 
See Anabasis, 30 P.3d at 1243; Bennion, 849 P.2d at 573. 
As to the kind of injunction requested by Sullivan, the statute actually precludes, 
rather than mandates, the granting of such relief. The statute authorizes the Board to 
impose certain remedies after a hearing, if a hearing is held. See Utah Code Ann. §40-6-
9(7)(a) (West 2004). Because the Board did not schedule or hold a hearing, it could not 
under the terms of the statute grant the requested relief. Even if the Board could impose 
remedies without first holding a hearing, the remedy specified in the statute for a payor's 
failure to deposit disputed funds into escrow is not an injunction requiring such a deposit, 
but rather an award of interest "as a substitute for an escrow account interest rate." Utah 
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Code Ann. §40-6-9(7)(a)(ii) (West 2004) (emphasis added). The statute confers no 
authority on the Board to grant the injunctive relief requested by Sullivan.12 See Hi-
Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Bagley & Co., 901 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Utah 1995) 
(noting administrative bodies have only those powers specifically granted by statute and 
any doubt as to the existence of a grant of power must be resolved against such grant). 
Finally, even if the Board had the authority to grant the u uuested injunction, it was 
a reasonable exercise of discretion for the Board to decline to do so because the statute 
contemplates a petitioner seeking his or her remedies in court where the Board declines 
to set a hearing. Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9(6)(b) (West 2004). It does not contemplate the 
Board attempting to grant partial relief where it is deferring to the courts to fashion an 
appropriate remedy. 
V. THE BOARD'S ACTION IN NOT CONTINUING ITS 
PROCEEDINGS WAS REASONABLE AND PROPER BECAUSE 
SULLIVAN REQUESTED NO CONTINUANCE AND THE 
STATUTE DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE A CONTINUANCE 
IN ANY EVENT 
Sullivan may raise on appeal only issues raised before the Board below. 
Associated General Contractors, 2001 UT 112, %21 n.5 and <|[34 n.7; Brown & Root, 947 
12
 As the Division noted at the March 28, 2007 hearing, under Utah Code Ann. §40-6-
9(7), "which describes the remedies available after a hearing to determine why proceeds 
have not been paid, the existence of an escrow account is an input to that decision-making 
process, not an output of the decision-making process." (R.l 85 at 28). In other words, the 
Board inquires into the existence of an escrow account if it holds a hearing, but is only 
authorized to award interest as a substitute remedy if no escrow is found to exist. The 
statute does not grant any injunctive power to order an escrow. With respect to the 
interest award the Board might have made had it set a hearing, the Board notes that 
prejudgment interest is a remedy available to Sullivan in district court. 
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P.2d at 677; Whitear, 973 P.2d at 985. Sullivan's argument that the "Board refused to 
continue this matter pending a judicial adjudication to obtain an interpretation of the 
subject Assignment" should not be countenanced because Sullivan requested no such 
continuance below. Instead, as clearly set forth in the transcript of the March 28, 2007 
hearing, Sullivan's only request was for an injunction requiring a deposit of disputed 
funds into escrow, and nothing more (R.185 at 21). 
Even if Sullivan had made such a request and preserved the issue for appeal, the 
Board's action in not continuing or staying its proceedings was reasonable because the 
statute itself does not provide for this course of action. The statute provides for two 
options: either the Board can set a hearing or, where it does not set a hearing, the 
petitioner is free to file an action in district court. Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9(6)(a) and (b) 
(West 2004). The statute does not provide for a "continuance" of the administrative 
proceedings to allow a parallel judicial proceeding. 
VI. SULLIVAN HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT HE WAS 
SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICED AS REQUIRED BY UTAH 
CODE ANN. §63-46b-16(4) 
Sullivan is entitled to relief from this Court only if he can demonstrate that he 
"has been substantially prejudiced by" the Board's actions. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-
16(4) (West 2004). Even if the Board had committed any error in the present case, 
however, Sullivan can show no prejudice because he has merely been directed to another 
forum in which to seek a remedy (including prejudgment interest on any sums he 
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contends should presently be in escrow, see Brief of Petitioner at 16), and has therefore 
not been prejudiced at all.13 
VII. SULLIVAN'S ASSERTIONS CONCERNING THE ALLEGED 
SCOPE OF THE UNPAID PROCEEDS PROBLEM ARE 
UNSUPPORTED AND ARE NOT RELEVANT TO ANY 
ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT 
In his brief, Sullivan makes a number of assertions designed to paint a picture of 
an unpaid royalty crisis in Utah, and of a Division and Board neglecting their duties to 
address the problem. See Brief of Petitioner at 15 (asserting that "untold millions of 
dollars" have been withheld from royalty owners in Utah, claiming "[t]he Board refuses 
to acknowledge or enforce Utah [royalty] laws," and bemoaning how "deeply ingrained is 
the Board and the Division's policy and practice to turn a blind eye to this industry-wide 
practice"). Because Sullivan did not raise these allegations below, they are unsupported 
by any evidence in the record. They are also not relevant to whether the Board acted 
reasonably in this case in deferring to the pending, parallel action in district court. 
Furthermore, the assertions conflict with the history of the Board's disposition of 
petitions concerning unpaid royalties. While Sullivan complains of not being given a 
hearing, and of the Board's alleged "ingrained practice" of inaction, the undersigned 
counsel can represent to the best of his knowledge that in only two cases out of 
n
 To the extent Sullivan might argue that the 25% penalty the Board is authorized to 
impose if it finds that funds were withheld "without reasonable justification," see Utah 
Code Ann. §40-6-9(7)(b)(i)(c) (West 2004), is a remedy not available to him in district 
court, it is noted that Sullivan withdrew any request for such relief when he narrowed his 
request of the Board to issuance of an escrow injunction alone (R.185 at 21). Sullivan 
may therefore not claim any prejudice in this regard. 
24 
approximately two dozen royalty petitions filed over the last fifteen years14 has the Board 
exercised its discretion to decline to set a hearing and instead send the petitioner to court. 
One of those cases is the present one, and the other (like the present case) involved no 
request for a hearing because all parties agreed that the matter should be resolved in 
district court.15 Far from demonstrating any unwillingness to respond to such petitions, 
the Board's prior handling of royalty matters demonstrates that although the Board is 
granted clear discretion to do so by statute, it has declined to set a hearing only in the 
rarest of cases (like the present one) in which there are sound reasons to allow a court of 
law to decide the disputed issues.16 
14
 These two dozen cases were those decided in: Docket No. 2007-019, Cause No. 139-
80 ("2007-019/139-80"), 2007-006/139-76, 2006-017/262-01 (the present case), 2005-
011/257-01, 2003-003/131-122, 2002-001/007-14, 2001-025/243-07, 2001-008/102-79, 
2001-001/131-119, 1998-017/189-04, 1997-030/240-02A & B, 1997-012/149-30B, 1997-
012/149-30A, 1997-008/240-01, 1996-006/131-116B, 1995-029/137-04, 1995-021,216-
02, 1995-017/160-29, 1995-003/131-116A, 1994-012/149-29, 1994-002/102-77, 1993-
042/102-76, 1993-034/149-28, 1992-037/102-74R, 1992-022/149-27R. The majority of 
these matters were settled during the mandatory 60-day investigation and negotiation 
process administered by the Division. This refutes Sullivan's assertions concerning the 
ineffectiveness of the Division's process. A few were dismissed on other grounds (such 
as statute of limitations or failure to prosecute) without the Board having decided as a 
discretionary matter under Section 40-6-9(6) whether to set a hearing or not. 
15
 The second case is that decided in Docket No. 97-030, Cause No. 240-2(B). 
16
 Although Sullivan suggested below that all royalty disputes ultimately implicate some 
underlying title instrument "that must first be interpreted to determine its meaning," 
(R.l 14-115), that suggestion is not true in the context of royalty matters filed with the 
Board. Many royalty disputes concern underlying royalty interests of known ownership 
and character and arise where payors have simply not paid the royalties due to financial 
difficulties or where there is some dispute concerning the amount of oil or gas produced 
or the price realized from its sale. The Division, as the agency that tracks the quantity of 
oil and gas produced from Utah wells, and that possesses expertise in oil and gas 
25 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Utah Board of Oil, Gas & Mining respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the Board's decision below as a reasonable exercise of the 
discretion granted it by statute. 
DATED this 6th day of December, 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNS (ilAERAL 
Michael S. JpfeffTon (#6903) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Responds i f Utah Board of Oil, 
Gas & Mining 
accounting, is often in a position to assist in investigating and negotiating resolutions of 
such disagreements without being asked (as here) to act as a court of law and issue rulings 
on disputed issues of contract interpretation and ownership of underlying property rights. 
See (R.103) (in which the Division discusses its expertise and role in royalty dispute 
investigations); (R.185 at 6-7) (setting forth testimony concerning the same). 
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Addendum 1: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
FILED 
MR 2 5 2007 
*3*}$ BOARD OF 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING?*8 4 m m 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRISTOPHER M. SULLIVAN, ; 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. 
KERR-McGEE OIL & GAS 
ONSHORE, LP, ] 
Respondent. ] 
1
 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
1
 OF LAW, AND ORDER 
1 Docket No. 2006-017 
) Cause No. 262-01 
This cause came on regularly for hearing before the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining (the 
"Board") on Wednesday, March 28, 2007, at 10:30 a.m., in the Hearing Room of the Utah 
Department of Natural Resources at 1594 West North Temple Street, in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The following Board members were present and participated in the hearing: Acting 
Chairman Kent R. Petersen, Robert J. Bayer; Douglas E. Johnson; Samuel C. Quigley; Jake Y. 
Harouny, Jean Semborski and Ruland J. Gill, Jr. Gil Hunt, Associate Director for Oil and Gas of 
the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining (the "Division") was present and participated in the hearing. 
Christopher A. Jones of Prince Yeates & Gehldzahler appeared on behalf of Petitioner 
Christopher M. Sullivan, ("Sullivan"), and Craig D. Galli of Holland & Hart appeared on behalf 
of Respondent Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Onshore, LP ("Kerr-McGee"). 
Michael S. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, represented the Board; and James P. 
Allen, Assistant Attorney General, represented the Division. 
£\f\f\A A Q 
NOW THEREFORE, the Board, having fully considered the arguments and 
representations made in the parties' filings and at the hearing, being fully advised, and good 
cause appearing, hereby makes and enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Notices of the time, place, and purpose of the March 28,2007 hearing were 
mailed to all interested parties, and were duly published in newspapers of general circulation 
pursuant to the requirements of Utah Administrative Code ("U.A.C.") Rule R641-106-100 
(2005). Copies of the Request for Agency Action were likewise mailed to all interested parties 
pursuant to U.A.C. Rule R641-104-135. 
2. Following the Petitioner's filing of its Request for Agency Action on July 31, 
2006 and the Respondent's filing of its Response to Request for Agency Action on September 
11, 2006, the Board at its December 6, 2006 hearing directed the Division to conduct a period of 
investigation and negotiation pursuant to Utah Code. Ann. §40-6-9(5). 
3. The investigation and negotiations conducted by the Division failed to resolve the 
subject dispute. On February 13, 2007 the Division filed its Memorandum Regarding 
Investigation and Negotiations (the Division's "Report"). In its Report, the Division noted that 
the subject dispute turned on the interpretation of a 1972 lease assignment and further noted that 
the "Division's investigation did not find any information that, if offered and proved in a hearing 
before the Board, would show that Kerr McGee suspended payments to Sullivan without a good 
faith judgment that the payments were not owed." The Division's Report notes that the parties 
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have commenced a parallel legal proceeding in State court, and recommends that the Board 
allow the parties to resolve the dispute in the State court proceeding rather than set any further 
hearings before the Board. 
4. At the March 28, 2007 hearing, the parties, through their counsel, confirmed that 
there is a pending State court action involving the subject dispute, and further confirmed that the 
dispute turns upon the interpretation of a 1972 lease assignment. The Respondent urged that the 
Request for Agency Action be dismissed so that the parties may resolve the dispute in State 
court. The Petitioner conceded at the hearing that the underlying dispute should be decided in 
State court, but urged the Board to grant the limited relief of ordering that the disputed funds be 
deposited into an interest-bearing account in the interim. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
5. Due and regular notice of the time, place, and purposes of the March 28, 2007 
hearing was given to all interested parties in the form and manner and within the time required 
by law and the rules and regulations of the Board. Due and regular notice of the filing of the 
Request for Agency Action was given to all interested parties in the form and manner and within 
the time required by law and the rules and regulations of the Board. 
6. The Board has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this Request for 
Agency Action pursuant to Sections Chapter 6 of Title 40 of the Utah Code Annotated, and has 
the power and authority to make and promulgate the order herein set forth. 
7. Following the Division's investigation in cases like the present one, Utah Code 
Ann. §40-6-9(6) gives the Board discretion to either (1) set a hearing, or (2) decline to set a 
hearing and allow the petitioner to seek a remedy in a court of competent jurisdiction instead. 
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Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9(7) authorizes the Board to impose certain remedies after a hearing, if a 
hearing is held. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 
A. Christopher M. Sullivan's Request for Agency Action is denied. 
B. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9(6), the Board declines to set any hearing in 
this matter and invites the parties to resolve the subject dispute through the already-pending State 
court case. 
C. The Board directs the Division, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9(6)(b), to turn 
over to Petitioner any information gathered during the investigation and negotiation. 
D. The Board has considered and decided this matter as a formal adjudication, 
pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-6 through -10 
(Supp. 2003), and the Rules of Practice and Procedure before the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, 
Utah Admin. Code R641 (2003). 
E. This Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order ("Order") is based 
exclusively upon evidence of record in this proceeding or on facts officially noted, and 
constitutes the signed written order stating the Board's decision and the reasons for the decision, 
as required by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10 (Supp. 
2003), and the Rules of Practice and Procedure before the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, Utah 
Admin. Code R641-109 (2003); and constitutes a final agency action as defined in the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act and Board rules. 
F. Notice of Right of Judicial Review by the Supreme Court of the State of 
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Utah. As required by Utah Code Ann. §63-46b- 10(e) to -10(g), the Board hereby notifies all 
parties to this proceeding that they have the right to seek judicial review of this Order by filing 
an appeal with the Supreme Court of the State of Utah within 30 days after the date this Order is 
entered. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) and -16 (1998). 
G. Notice of Right to Petition for Reconsideration, As an alternative, but not as a 
prerequisite to judicial review, the Board hereby notifies all parties to this proceeding that they 
may apply for reconsideration of this Order. Utah Code Ann. § 63~46b-13 (Supp. 2003). The 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act provides: 
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for 
which review by the agency or by a superior agency under Section 
63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if the order would otherwise 
constitute final agency action, any party may file a written request 
for reconsideration with the agency, stating the specific grounds 
upon which relief is requested. 
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the filing of the request is 
not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of the order. 
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the agency 
and one copy shall be sent by mail to each party by the person 
making the request. 
(3)(a) The agency head, or a person designated for that purpose, 
shall issue a written order granting the request or denying the 
request. 
(b) If the agency head or the person designated for that purpose 
does not issue an order within 20 days after the filing of the 
request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered to be 
denied. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 (Supp. 2003). 
The Rules of Practice and Procedure before the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining entitled 
"Rehearing and Modification of Existing Orders" state: 
Any person affected by a final order or decision of the Board may 
file a petition for rehearing. Unless otherwise provided, a petition 
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for rehearing must be filed no later than the 10th day of the month 
following the date of signing of the final order or decision for 
which the rehearing is sought. A copy of such petition will be 
served on each other party to the proceeding no later than the 15th 
day of that month. 
Utah Admin. Code R641-110-100 (2003). 
See Utah Administrative Code R641-110-200 for the required contents of a petition for 
rehearing. The Board hereby rules that should there be any conflict between the deadlines 
provided in the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and the Rules of Practice and Procedure 
before the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, the later of the two deadlines shall be available to any 
party moving to rehear this matter. If the Board later denies a timely petition for rehearing, the 
aggrieved party may seek judicial review of the order by perfecting an appeal with the Utah 
Supreme Court within 30 days thereafter. 
H. The Board retains exclusive and continuing jurisdiction of all matters covered by 
this Order and of all parties affected thereby; and specifically, the Board retains and reserves 
exclusive and continuing jurisdiction to make further orders as appropriate and authorized by 
statute and applicable regulations. 
I. The Chairman's signature on a facsimile copy of this Order shall be deemed the 
equivalent of a signed original for all purposes. 
ENTERED this-^STay of April 2007. 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
Kent R. Petersen, Acting Chairman ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER for Docket No. 2006-017, Cause No. 262-01, to be 
mailed with postage prepaid, this 14th day of May, 2007, to the following: 
Bradley H. Parker 
James W. McConkie 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Attorneys for Christopher Sullivan 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Craig D. Galli 
Cecilia M. Romero 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Attorneys for Kerr-McGee 
Oil & Gas Onshore LP 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Christopher M. Sullivan 
6808 Harvest Road 
P.O. Box 11128 
Boulder, CO 80301 
Michael S. Johnson 
Stephen Schwendiman 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Utah Board of Oil, Gas & Mining 
1594 West North Temple, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
(Hand Delivered) 
Steven F. Alder 
James P. Allen 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Utah Division of Oil, Gas & Mining 
1594 West North Temple, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
(Hand Delivered) 
hJj^t JiM^J 
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Addendum 2: Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9 (West 2004) 
40-6-9. Proceeds from sale of production — Payment of proceeds — Requirements — 
Proceeding on petition to determine cause of nonpayment — Remedies — Penalties. 
(1) (a) The oil and gas proceeds derived from the sale of production from any well producing oil or 
gas in the state shall be paid to any person legally entitled to the payment of the proceeds not later than 
180 days after the first day of the month following the date of the first sale and thereafter not later than 
30 days after the end of the calendar month within which payment is received by the payor for 
production, unless other periods or arrangements are provided for in a valid contract with the person 
entitled to the proceeds. 
(b) The payment shall be made directly to the person entitled to the payment by the payor. 
(c) The payment is considered to have been made upon deposit in the United States mail. 
(2) Payments shall be remitted to any person entitled to oil and gas proceeds annually for the 
aggregate of up to 12 months accumulation of proceeds, if the total amount owed is $100 or less. 
(3) (a) Any delay in determining whether a person is legally entitled to an interest in the oil and gas 
proceeds does not affect payments to other persons entitled to payment. 
(b) (i) If accrued payments cannot be made within the time limits specified in Subsection (1) or (2), 
the payor shall deposit all oil and gas proceeds credited to the eventual oil and gas proceeds owner to an 
escrow account in a federally insured bank or savings and loan institution using a standard escrow 
document form. 
(ii) The deposit shall earn interest at the highest rate being offered by that institution for the amount 
and term of similar demand deposits. 
(iii) The escrow agent may commingle money received into escrow from any one lessee or operator, 
purchaser, or other person legally responsible for payment. 
(iv) Payment of principal and accrued interest from the escrow account shall be made by the escrow 
agent to the person legally entitled to them within 30 days from the date of receipt by the escrow agent 
of final legal determination of entitlement to the payment. 
(v) Applicable escrow fees shall be deducted from the payments. 
(4) Any person entitled to oil and gas proceeds may file a petition with the board to conduct a hearing 
to determine why the proceeds have not been paid. 
(5) Upon receipt of the petition, the board shall set the matter for investigation and negotiation by the 
division within 60 days. 
(6) (a) If the matter cannot be resolved by negotiation as of that date, the board may set a hearing 
within 30 days. 
(b) If the board does not set a hearing, any information gathered during the investigation and 
negotiation shall be given to the petitioner who may then seek a remedy in a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
(7) (a) If, after a hearing, the board finds the proceeds have not been deposited in an interest bearing 
escrow account in accordance with Subsection (3), the board may order that: 
(i) a complete accounting be made; and 
(ii) the proceeds be subject to an interest rate of 1-1/2% per month, as a substitute for an escrow 
account interest rate, accruing from the date the payment should have been suspended in accordance 
with Subsection (3). 
(b) If, after a hearing, the board finds the delay of payment is without reasonable justification, the 
board may: 
(i) if the proceeds have been deposited in an interest bearing escrow account in accordance with 
Subsection (3): 
(A) order a complete accounting; 
(B) require the proceeds and accruing interest to remain in the escrow account; and 
(C) assess a penalty of up to 25% of the total proceeds and interest in the escrow account; or 
(ii) if the proceeds have not been deposited in an interest bearing escrow account in accordance with 
Subsection (3), assess a penalty of up to 25% of the total proceeds and interest as determined under 
Subsection (a). 
(c) (i) Upon finding that the delay of payment is without reasonable justification, the board shall set a 
date not later than 90 days from the hearing for final distribution of the total sum. 
(ii) If payment is not made by the required date, the total proceeds, interest, and any penalty as 
provided in Subsection (b) shall be subject to interest at a rate of 1-1/2% per month until paid. 
(d) If, after a hearing, the board finds the delay of payment is with reasonable justification and the 
proceeds have been deposited in an interest bearing escrow account in accordance with Subsection (3), 
the payor may not be required to make an accounting or payment of appropriately suspended proceeds 
until the condition which justified suspension has been satisfied. 
(8) The circumstances under which the board may find the suspension of payment of proceeds is 
made with reasonable justification, such that the penalty provisions of Subsections (7)(b) and (7)(c)(ii) 
do not apply, include, but are not limited to, the following: 
(a) the payor: 
(i) fails to make the payment in good faith reliance upon a title opinion by a licensed Utah attorney 
objecting to the lack of good and marketable title of record of the person claiming entitlement to 
payment; and 
(ii) furnishes a copy of the relevant portions of the opinion to the person for necessary curative 
action; 
(b) the payor receives information which: 
(i) in the payor's good faith judgment, brings into question the entitlement of the person claiming the 
right to the payment to receive that payment; 
(ii) has rendered the title unmarketable; or 
(iii) may expose the payor to the risk of liability to third parties if the payment is made; 
(c) the total amount of oil and gas proceeds in possession of the payor owed to the person making 
claim to payment is less than $100 at the end of any month; or 
(d) the person entitled to payment has failed or refused to execute a division or transfer order 
acknowledging the proper interest to which the person claims to be entitled and setting forth the mailing 
address to which payment may be directed, provided the division or transfer order does not alter or 
amend the terms of the lease. 
(9) If the circumstances described in Subsection (8)(a) or (b) arise, the payor may: 
(a) suspend and escrow the payments in accordance with Subsection (3); or 
(b) at the request and expense of the person claiming entitlement to the payment, make the payment 
into court on an interpleader action to resolve the claim and avoid liability under this chapter. 
Amended by Chapter 151, 1993 General Session 
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Addendum 3: Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 (West 2004) 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, 
the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the 
form required by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings and 
proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of formal 
adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that 
a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on 
its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to 
follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-making body or were 
subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving 
facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Amended by Chapter 72, 1988 General Session 
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